Frederic Van De Water, Dixie State University
Social and Behavioral Sciences
In the Fall of 1963, President Lyndon B. Johnson chose to escalate American participation in the Vietnam War Conflict based on false intelligence information about the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Once Johnson realized the full truth of the event, he was caught in a public relations trap since he had already announced that the United States had been attacked. Throughout the Johnson administration, there was a large discrepancy between public relations messages to the American people and internal statements about the actual mission, objectives, and success of the war. In the early days of the Nixon administration, Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, a senior consultant from the RAND Corporation, leaked thousands of pages of classified documents about this phenomenon to the New York Times in hopes of bringing an end to the Vietnam War. Since this time, many historians and policy analysts have utilized this limited collection to study the war. In 2011, the Obama Administration had the National Archives release the complete set of documents online. Utilizing this expanded collection, I will compare and contrast how the Johnson administration’s message either conflicted or at times coincided with what was being done in Vietnam as part of wider Department of Defense policy.