Voluntary or Not, Still No Equilibrium Play in the Ultimatum Game: A Failed Replication Skip to main content
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2020 Abstracts

Voluntary or Not, Still No Equilibrium Play in the Ultimatum Game: A Failed Replication

Brooksby, Austin; Meyer, Jake; Rentschler, Lucas; Spofford, Robbie (Utah State University)

Faculty Advisor: Rentschler, Lucas (Jon M. Huntsman School of Business, Economics and Finance Department)

The ultimatum game is a common experimental economics game done in pairs in which one person chooses a way of dividing a sum of money, and then proposes that split as an ultimatum to the other: Either accept it, or we both walk away with nothing. In theory, equilibrium play would indicate everyone should accept any split they're offered-regardless of the equity-but the experimental economics literature robustly rejects that theory. Smith and Wilson's 2017 paper "Equilibrium Play in Voluntary Ultimatum Games: Beneficence Cannot Be Extorted" produced results different from the vast literature, by making game participation voluntary within the lab. We attempted to replicate Smith and Wilson's results, but failed to do so. The most notable difference between our experiments was our subject pool, so we ran additional trials of the standard ultimatum game and confirmed our subject pool was not significantly different than the general literature. Our paper provides a great example of the importance of replicating results in the social sciences, in addition to a specific contribution to the ultimatum game literature.