Authors: Brandon Ascione
Mentors: Katie Paxman
Insitution: Brigham Young University
T 1.4.1 contains what appears to be a skeptical regressive argument that ultimately leads to a complete loss of belief. Yet, Hume claims that neither he nor anyone else is compelled by this argument because like breathing, it is the nature of humans to form beliefs. Thus, it becomes challenging to understand why anyone would engage in such a skeptical thought process from the start. Drawing on Peter Millican’s critique of this iterating skepticism and Donald Ainslie’s interpretive work on T 1.4.1, it becomes clear that there is disagreement over what Hume’s intended purposes for T 1.4.1 might be. This paper argues that T 1.4.1 is an account of the psychology of a particular kind of skeptical disposition. Hume’s work on the passions can account and explain the psychology of the skeptic with this skeptical disposition. By taking a more holistic analysis of passages from Books 1 and 2 of the Treatise and citing Margaret Watkins’ conception of delicacy of passion, a compelling case is made that Hume’s own skeptical crisis from T 1.4.7 was motivated by such a skeptical disposition that was driven by the passion of fear.